How the prototype answers a question — and how three models handle the same evidence
Every answer below is built only from passages retrieved out of the Los Angeles pilot collection, with each claim cited back to a page and a scanned original. The same five questions were put to three models on identical evidence.
The prototype does not hand a question to a model and hope. It searches first, then constrains the model to what the search returned.
1A question is matched against all 12,260 indexed passages, by keyword and by meaning at once.
2The eight best passages are pulled, each carrying its title, page number and link to the scan.
3The model is instructed to answer only from those eight, to cite every factual sentence, and to say plainly when they do not cover the question.
4Each bracketed number in the answer points back to a numbered source, so any claim can be followed to the page it came from.
Because all three models received byte-identical passages, any difference between the answers comes from the model, not from the search.
Three of the five questions are demonstration queries — the kind of synthesis across documents and decades that a catalogue search cannot do. Two are deliberate probes for questions the collection cannot answer, to see whether a model admits the gap or fills it.
Where the project stands
The prototype is built in stages, each one usable before the next begins. Six are complete; the seventh is what this document reports on.
Done
Harvest
167 Los Angeles items pulled from Stanford's catalogue with their metadata and PDFs.
Done
Text extraction and quality scoring
Every PDF read page by page, scored for legibility, and split into passages. 99.4% of the text came through clean; the scorer specifically watches for digits corrupted into letters, because corrupted population figures are exactly what a demonstration would quote.
Done
Corpus rebuild
A fault that collapsed multi-part items was fixed and the collection rebuilt — 182 documents drawn from 166 catalogue items, including the 17 separate reports held inside the 2021 Brandeis study.
Done
Retrieval index
Keyword search and meaning-based search combined into a single ranking. Building it surfaced a fault where front-matter repeated across sibling reports crowded out the passages that actually answered a question; both the duplicates and their near-copies are now suppressed.
Done
Answer synthesis
Answers constrained to the retrieved passages, cited claim by claim, with three models compared on identical evidence (this report).
Done
Interface
A live page where a question is typed and the answer streams in beside the passages it came from — citations open a source card in place, and a companion panel adds clearly separate national context from named Pew Research studies, never blended with the archive's own evidence. Answers there are roughly half the length of the transcripts in this report, and the two Claude models now write in the register of the archive's own Documensch newsletter rather than the plainer voice recorded below — a later change, made after this comparison was run, that left every citation and refusal rule untouched.
Now
Demonstration preparation
The quotation defect flagged above is improved, not fully closed — the model now marks a correction rather than hiding it, but a fully airtight fix (native citation support) is still open. Table-heavy technical appendices that crowd out readable prose are a known, unresolved gap. Rehearsing the vetted queries end to end has not yet happened.
The three models, side by side
Model
Invented citations
Fabricated figures
Refused both probes
Avg. time
Per 1,000 questions
Sonnet 5Anthropic API
0
0
Yes
12.1s
$16.60
Opus 5Anthropic API
0
0
Yes
13.2s
$39.52
Qwen3 8Blocal, on-device
0
0
Yes
20.0s
free
“Invented citations” counts references to sources that were never supplied. “Fabricated figures” counts numbers, dates and place names that appear in an answer but in no passage — checked mechanically against the source text. All three models came through both checks clean; the differences between them lie elsewhere.
Sonnet 5
Anthropic API
Strong
Highest citation density of the three — 78–86% of sentences on the vetted questions carry a source marker.
Refused both out-of-scope questions and explained what the collection actually holds instead.
Named the gap on intermarriage: no citywide study after 1986, so no claim about the city as a whole in the 2000s.
Clear structure — sections by era or study, which makes an answer easy to check against the sources.
Weak
Less reconciliation across documents than Opus. It did not notice that two documents name the same researcher differently, or that the 1986 and 1997 studies divide the city on incompatible lines.
Reported a 1997 low-income figure as a poverty finding without distinguishing an income threshold from a poverty measure.
Flags
Quoted “maps A-1 and A-2” where the scan reads maps a-l and a-2 — a lowercase L standing in for the digit 1, silently corrected inside quotation marks.
Opus 5
Anthropic API
Strong
Reconciled sources across documents — flagged that a 2010 bibliography gives the author as “Herman, R.” while the 2021 notes give “Pini Herman,” and that both point to the same Federation study.
Drew a methodological distinction the others missed: a reported figure is “a low-income threshold rather than a poverty measure as such.”
Reported damaged scans rather than working around them — “badly garbled in the scan, with two text columns interleaved.”
Warned against over-reading its own answer, noting a pattern “may simply be an artifact of having one general study and one subcommunity study in the corpus.”
Weak
Lowest citation density on some questions (58–75%), because more of its prose is qualification and connective reasoning that carries no marker.
Roughly 2.4× the running cost of Sonnet for answers of comparable length.
Flags
Quoted “the Los Angeles urban model of the auto culture” where the scan reads angeles urban rmodelof the auto culture — damaged text reconstructed inside quotation marks.
Qwen3 8B
local, on-device
Strong
Invented nothing. Every figure, date and place name in its answers was traced back to a supplied passage.
Refused both out-of-scope questions, including the harder one where all eight passages concerned COVID-19 and the question asked about 1918.
Runs entirely on the laptop. No data leaves the building and there is no per-question cost.
Weak
Asserted a thirty-year trend the collection cannot support, treating a study of one immigrant subcommunity as evidence about Los Angeles in the 2000s generally. Both other models explicitly declined to do this.
Read an endnote bibliography as a statement of method, reporting that poverty estimates “were derived from the American Community Survey” when the passage only lists it among the study's references.
Refusals state what is absent but not what is present, which is less useful to a researcher trying to find the right collection.
Reported no damaged scans and no conflicts between sources.
Slower than the hosted models — 20.0s average against 12–13s — while producing much shorter answers.
Flags
8 billion parameters, the smallest model tested. Whether a larger local model closes the gap is untested.
The answers
Reproduced exactly as returned. Switch between models with the tabs; open the source list to follow any citation to its scan at Stanford.
Demonstration query
How did concerns about intermarriage in Los Angeles change from the 1970s to the 2000s?
5 of 8 sources used · 78% of sentences cited · 23.8s
The corpus offers a fairly narrow window on this question: one substantial study from the mid-1980s (Bruce Phillips's 1985 paper and the companion 1986 Los Angeles Jewry: A Demographic Portrait) and one 2011 study focused specifically on the Iranian Jewish subcommunity. Nothing here documents concerns about intermarriage in Los Angeles across the 1990s or in general-population terms for the 2000s — the 2000s material that exists concerns one ethnic subgroup, not the community as a whole.
Late 1970s–1980s framing. Phillips's 1985 paper, drawing on population studies from Denver (1981), Los Angeles (1979), and Phoenix (1983), opens by calling intermarriage "probably the most important challenge facing American Jewry today because of its potential impact on the composition of the Jewish population" [3]. This concern is presented as a national one that had recently entered popular consciousness — the paper traces it back to Marshall Sklare's writing before the 1970s and to the National Jewish Population Study findings published in the American Jewish Year Book in 1973, which the paper credits with turning intermarriage into "an issue of popular Jewish concern" [1]. The worry is framed demographically: rising intermarriage could either shrink the Jewish population through assimilation or change "the Jewish community's traditional understanding of what constitutes the 'typical Jewish family'" [3]. Notably, when the actual Los Angeles data are examined, the passages show Los Angeles had the lowest intermarriage rate of any Western community studied at the time — 49 percent for couples under 30 versus 66 percent in Denver and 60 percent in Phoenix, and 21 percent for the 30–39 cohort versus 40 percent in Denver [4]. So the 1980s concern in the LA material is largely a reflection of a national anxiety rather than a claim that Los Angeles itself was an outlier case.
2011 framing (Iranian Jewish Los Angeles). The one 2000s-adjacent document in the corpus, a 2011 study of young Iranian American Jews in Los Angeles, describes intermarriage concern in a much more localized, intra-communal register: "concerns about intermarriage are still a significant issue in the Iranian Jewish community of Los Angeles," with older Iranians in particular fearing it "as a threat to the continuity of community traditions" [2]. This is paired with the observation that Iranian Jewish households are, by the passage's own account, unusually endogamous — "not only very endogamous, but prefer their sons and daughters to marry Iranian Jews" — and that intermarriage rates among Iranian Jews are described as "much lower" than in "the wider Jewish community" [5][2].
What changed and what the passages don't show. Taken together, the documents show a shift in unit of analysis rather than a documented shift in the underlying rate: the 1985–86 material treats intermarriage as a citywide demographic indicator compared across Western Jewish communities [4], while the 2011 material treats it as an internal concern of one ethnic-origin subcommunity, framed generationally (older vs. younger Iranian Jews) rather than geographically [2][5]. The passages do not offer a general Los Angeles-wide intermarriage rate for the 1990s or 2000s that would let you compare directly against the 1979-based figures in [4], and they do not explain whether or how concern among the broader (non-Iranian) Los Angeles Jewish population evolved in that period. That gap — roughly two decades of the city's general Jewish population — is simply not covered in this corpus.
7 of 8 sources used · 58% of sentences cited · 20.7s
The passages don't track a change in Los Angeles across that span. They give you two widely separated snapshots with nothing in between, and the later one is about a single subcommunity rather than the city's Jewish population as a whole.
What the 1970s–80s material shows. Intermarriage became a subject of popular Jewish concern only after the National Jewish Population Study findings were published in the American Jewish Year Book in 1973 [1]. By 1985 Bruce Phillips was calling it "probably the most important challenge facing American Jewry today," framing the stakes as either a shrinking Jewish population (if mixed-married Jews assimilate) or a redefinition of the "typical Jewish family" to include non-Jews in Jewish households [3]. His analysis drew on community studies in Denver (1981), Los Angeles (1979), and Phoenix (1983), which he describes as regions where intermarriage is highest [6]. Within that western context, Los Angeles was the low outlier: the 1986 Los Angeles Jewry: A Demographic Portrait reports that L.A. had the lowest intermarriage rate of any community studied to that point, with couple rates of 49 percent under age 30 against 66 percent in Denver and 60 percent in Phoenix, and 21 percent for ages 30–39 against Denver's 40 percent [4]. Phillips also examined gender, noting Steven M. Cohen's claim that Jewish men historically out-married about twice as often as Jewish women, and discussing Los Angeles men and women separately — though this page of the scan is badly damaged, with two columns of text interleaved, and I can't reliably report what it says about the L.A. figures [7].
What the 2000s-era material shows. The only later document here is a 2011 study of young Iranian American Jews in Los Angeles, which reports that Iranian Jewish intermarriage rates are much lower than those of several other Jewish groups, citing Bozorgmehr, Der-Martirosian and Waldinger's 1996 finding that "Iranian Jewish households are not only very endogamous, but prefer their sons and daughters to marry Iranian Jews" [5]. Concern nonetheless persists: older Iranians are described as fearing intermarriage as a threat to the continuity of community traditions [2]. Note that this study's evidence on intermarriage rests on 1990s literature — Hanassab (1998), Bozorgmehr et al. (1996), Philips and Khalili (1995) — so it is not independent measurement of 2000s conditions [2][5].
The gap. There is no passage here covering Los Angeles Jewish intermarriage in the 1990s or 2000s at the community-wide level, no follow-up to the 1979 Los Angeles population study, and no document that compares the earlier figures with later ones. The Iranian Jewish material and the 1979-based western comparison are measuring different populations and are never set against each other in these documents. Any claim that concern intensified, eased, or shifted in character across those decades would go beyond what these passages support.
5 of 8 sources used · 43% of sentences cited · 24.7s
Concerns about intermarriage in Los Angeles remained significant throughout the 1970s and into the 2000s, though the nature of these concerns evolved. In the 1970s, intermarriage was recognized as a growing issue within the Jewish community, with studies highlighting its potential impact on Jewish continuity and identity [3][6]. For instance, Los Angeles had one of the lowest intermarriage rates among Western communities, with rates of 49% for those under 30 and 21% for the 30-39 age group [4]. These findings underscored the relative stability of Jewish identity in Los Angeles compared to other regions.
By the 2000s, concerns about intermarriage persisted, particularly within specific subgroups such as the Iranian Jewish community in Los Angeles. While intermarriage rates among Iranian Jews were lower than in the broader Jewish community, the issue remained significant due to fears of losing traditional community practices and continuity [2][5]. This suggests that while intermarriage rates may have fluctuated, the emotional and cultural weight of the issue remained strong, especially in communities with strong ties to their heritage.
Demonstration query
What do these studies say about Jewish poverty in LA, and how were the estimates made?
4 of 8 sources used · 83% of sentences cited · 11.8s
The passages give three distinct data points on Jewish poverty in LA, from different studies and methods, and they don't connect cleanly into a single trend.
The 1997 survey and its 2010 reuse. The Los Angeles Jewish Population Survey of 1997, conducted by Pini Herman for the Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles, found that 519,151 Jews resided in "the western half of Los Angeles County (the City) and the eastern part of Ventura County (the Valley)," and that within this population "9.4% of households had an income under $10,000 and 3.4% of individuals were unemployed" [6]. This 1997 figure was still being cited in 2010 by The Jewish Safety Net Responds to the Economic Crisis, a case study of Greater LA that used the 1997 survey's geographic parameters as its working definition of the LA Jewish community even while writing about the 2008–2010 recession [6]. That 2010 paper also notes, citing Lerner (1976), that "for most of this new poor, their poverty is relative, as they are generally not on public assistance or considered the extreme poor," though "many lack basic necessities and some seek assistance from the Jewish safety net" [6]. The same paper reports that countywide unemployment (not specifically Jewish unemployment) "hovered around 11-13% in the final months of 2009" [6] — a general LA County figure given for context, not a Jewish-community statistic.
The 1986 demographic portrait.Los Angeles Jewry: A Demographic Portrait compares income across cities using Gallup polling data, finding LA Jews "remarkably similar in income" to New York Jews and "far ahead of Jews nationwide" [3]. It cautions that differences in poverty incidence between New York/California Jews and Jews elsewhere "may be overstated, due both to the bias of telephone polling and variance in the cost of living" [3] — an explicit methodological caveat about the survey instrument itself.
The 2021 Brandeis study. The passages provided reference a poverty-guidelines methodology note (HHS 2021 federal poverty thresholds) used somewhere in the Well-Being Report[8] and By the Numbers[2], but the actual poverty findings or percentages from the 2021 study are not present in the passages given to me — only the citation apparatus survives here, not the results themselves.
What's missing. These three sources use different geographic definitions, different survey methods (telephone polling in 1986, a dedicated population survey in 1997, secondary reuse of that survey in 2010), and apparently a poverty-guideline-based methodology in 2021 whose actual findings aren't in this passage set. No passage here computes or states a change in the Jewish poverty rate over time, and I cannot construct one from figures given for different populations and years.
6 of 8 sources used · 64% of sentences cited · 20.4s
The passages contain only fragments on this topic, and none of them report a poverty rate from the 2021 Brandeis study.
The most concrete figures come secondhand, through the 2010 case study The Jewish Safety Net Responds to the Economic Crisis, which defines the LA Jewish community using the geographic parameters of the 1997 Los Angeles Jewish Population Survey (Herman, 1998) [6]. That survey covered the population served by the Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles and found that 519,151 Jews resided in "the western half of Los Angeles County (the City) and the eastern part of Ventura County (the Valley)," of whom 9.4% of households had an income under $10,000 and 3.4% of individuals were unemployed [6]. The 2010 paper sets these against a Los Angeles County peak unemployment rate of "around 11-13%" in late 2009 and into March 2010, drawn from the Employment Development Department [6]. It also distinguishes a category of "new poor" whose poverty is relative — generally not on public assistance and not the "extreme poor" in Lerner's 1976 sense — but who lack basic necessities and turn to the Jewish safety net [6]. That framing rests on a single document, and the underlying LA figures are all 1997 data being applied to a 2009–2010 recession, a gap the paper itself makes visible.
On method, the fullest discussion is in the 1986 Los Angeles Jewry: a demographic portrait, which compares Gallup data against individual community studies and argues the Gallup data "may well be the more accurate" because California and New York non-Hispanic whites overall, not just Jews, earned more than other Americans [3]. It explicitly cautions that differences in "the incidence of poverty" between New York and California Jews and Jews elsewhere "may be overstated, due both to the bias of telephone polling and variance in the cost of living" [3]. That is the only methodological self-criticism about poverty measurement in this set.
For the 2021 Brandeis study, the passages supplied are almost entirely front matter and endnotes. Both the By the Numbers and Well-Being reports cite the HHS 2021 federal poverty guidelines, so a federal-threshold measure was evidently used somewhere in those reports [2][8], and both draw comparisons to Pew's "Jewish Americans in 2020" [2]. But no poverty figure, household count below threshold, or sampling description appears here. The population estimates I do have from 2021 — 294,200 Jewish households and 564,700 Jewish individuals — are not broken out by income [1].
What is missing: any 2021 poverty statistic; any description of how the Brandeis/NORC study sampled or weighted; the actual text of the Herman 1997 Needs Report, which appears only as a bibliography entry [5]; and any document that compares poverty across these three eras directly.
6 of 8 sources used · 75% of sentences cited · 25.3s
The 2021 Study of Jewish Los Angeles (Brandeis) reports that in 2021, there were 294,200 Jewish households in Los Angeles, with 737,900 people in Jewish households, 564,700 Jewish individuals, and 462,900 Jewish adults. The percentage of Jewish households in different regions of Los Angeles varies, with 4% in North County Valleys, 26% in West Valley, 15% in East Valley, and 24% in Central/Metro/Mid [1].
The 2021 Study also notes that poverty estimates for Jewish populations in Los Angeles were derived from the American Community Survey (ACS) 2019 5-year estimates [2]. These estimates are further supported by data from the Pew Research Center, which provides demographic and socioeconomic information on Jewish Americans [4].
In contrast, a 2010 study, The Jewish Safety Net Responds to the Economic Crisis: A Case Study of Greater Los Angeles, found that 9.4% of Jewish households in Los Angeles had an income under $10,000, and 3.4% of Jewish individuals were unemployed [6]. This study used data from the 1997 Los Angeles Jewish Population Survey, which analyzed the Jewish population served by the Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles [5].
The 1986 study, Los Angeles Jewry: a demographic portrait, notes that Los Angeles Jews had higher incomes compared to Jews nationwide and non-Hispanic whites in other regions, though differences in poverty rates may be overstated due to sampling biases and cost-of-living variations [3].
These studies rely on a mix of survey data, census estimates, and demographic analyses to estimate poverty and economic conditions among Jewish populations in Los Angeles.
Demonstration query
Which neighborhoods recur across the population studies, and how did that shift?
4 of 8 sources used · 86% of sentences cited · 18.7s
Two distinct neighborhood geographies appear in this corpus, and the passages do not connect them into a single continuous narrative.
The 1900–1940 era, per the 1986 "Demographic Portrait": At the turn of the century, Los Angeles Jews were concentrated downtown, with additional concentrations in the nearby Westlake and University districts [3]. Between 1910 and 1926, "downtown" itself shifted internally — first to Temple Street in the teens, then to Central Avenue in the twenties — though the passage stresses both remained essentially urban and close to what is now considered downtown [1]. The real dispersal came in the 1920s boom years, with migration east across the Los Angeles River to Boyle Heights, and west to Fairfax, Hollywood, and West Adams [1]. Hollywood itself is noted as having been "largely rural as late as 1915" before becoming "entirely urban" within a decade [3].
The Urban Core in the 1970s: The same 1986 document later reports that the "Urban Core" — which had been losing Jewish households through 1974 — reversed course and grew 40 percent by 1979, for a net increase of 16.8 percent over the decade 1970–1979, as rising housing costs elsewhere pushed families back into previously declining neighborhoods [2]. The passage does not specify whether "Urban Core" refers to the same downtown/Westlake/University-district area described for 1900–1940, though the label suggests continuity with the original center of settlement.
The 1997 survey's enclaves: The Los Angeles Jewish Population Survey '97 identifies a different set of neighborhoods — Hancock Park, Pico-Robertson, and Valley Village — as Orthodox enclaves clustered within walking distance of synagogues and schools, a pattern the passage explicitly calls a departure from "the Los Angeles urban model of the auto culture" [4].
What does and doesn't recur: None of Hancock Park, Pico-Robertson, or Valley Village appear in the 1986 document's account of 1900–1980 settlement patterns, and none of Boyle Heights, Fairfax, West Adams, Temple Street, or Central Avenue appear in the 1997 survey passage supplied here. Hollywood is the one neighborhood the 1986 study names as a 1920s growth area [1][3], but the 1997 survey passage does not mention Hollywood at all, so these documents do not let me say what became of that neighborhood's Jewish population by the later period. The corpus as given does not include a document that tracks the same set of neighborhoods across both eras, so any claim about a "shift" connecting the 1920s westward migration to the 1997 Orthodox enclaves would go beyond what these passages demonstrate.
5 of 8 sources used · 75% of sentences cited · 18.8s
The passages contain only two population studies with neighborhood-level detail — the 1986 Los Angeles Jewry: A Demographic Portrait and the 1997 Los Angeles Jewish Population Survey (published 1998) — and they name almost entirely different neighborhoods, so a genuine recurrence across studies is thin in this corpus.
The 1986 portrait maps the early period. At the turn of the century Jews lived in what is now "downtown," with additional concentrations in the Westlake and University districts [3]. Between 1910 and 1926 the share living in the older Jewish settlement fell from 30 to 3 percent, with Temple Street succeeding downtown in the teens and Central Avenue in the twenties — both close enough to downtown that Jews "remained essentially urban" [1]. The genuine break came in the 1920s boom, along two lines: east across the Los Angeles River to Boyle Heights, and west to Fairfax, Hollywood, and West Adams [1]. Boyle Heights the study likens to areas of second settlement in older eastern cities [1]. Hollywood, largely rural as late as 1915, was entirely urban ten years later [3].
The only trend the 1986 study reports for the later period in these passages is not neighborhood-specific but zonal: the Urban Core, which had lost Jewish households consistently through 1974, showed a 40-percent increase by 1979, for a net increase of 16.8 percent over 1970–1979 [2]. The study attributes this to housing appreciation and speculation pushing families and even single persons into previously declining, cheaper neighborhoods [2].
By 1997 the named neighborhoods are different again, and the framing has changed from settlement waves to denominational clustering: Hancock Park, Pico-Robertson, and Valley Village are identified as Orthodox enclaves within walking distance of synagogues and schools, which the survey describes as running counter to the Los Angeles auto-culture model [4]. That survey also treats the city as having no single center, "described, facetiously, as the 'largest village in the world' and more seriously as a place with multiple urban cores," across roughly 4,600 square miles [8].
What these passages will not support: any claim that a specific neighborhood was tracked from one study to the next. Fairfax and Hollywood appear only in the 1920s discussion [1]; Hancock Park, Pico-Robertson, and Valley Village appear only in 1997 [4]. Neither document, as excerpted here, compares its neighborhood map to the other's, and there is no passage covering Boyle Heights after the interwar period or the Westside in the postwar decades. The 1986 study announces a 1940–1980 section [3], but no passage from it beyond the Urban Core figures [2] is present. Denominational shifts between the 1979 and 1997 surveys are given as citywide percentages, not by neighborhood [4].
5 of 8 sources used · 100% of sentences cited · 23.5s
Temple Street and Central Avenue were early Jewish centers in Los Angeles, succeeding "downtown" as Jewish centers in the teens and twenties, respectively [1]. By the 1920s, Boyle Heights and neighborhoods west of the Los Angeles River, such as Fairfax, Hollywood, and West Adams, became significant Jewish areas [1]. These areas, including Boyle Heights, were considered similar to second-settlement areas in older cities [1].
The 1997 Los Angeles Jewish Population Survey noted that Jewish neighborhoods are spread across various areas, with no single central core, and described Los Angeles as having multiple urban cores [8]. The survey also identified Orthodox enclaves in neighborhoods such as Hancock Park, Pico-Robertson, and Valley Village [4].
The shift in Jewish residential patterns reflects broader urban development and demographic changes, with Jewish populations moving from the original downtown areas to newer, more distant neighborhoods as the city expanded [1][3]. The 1979 data showed a 40-percent increase in the Urban Core, indicating a return to central areas despite earlier trends of suburbanization [2].
Out-of-scope probe
What did the Cleveland Jewish Federation's 1987 population study find about synagogue membership?
A different city entirely. The search still returns eight plausible-looking passages on synagogue membership and multi-city comparisons.
8 of 8 sources used · 33% of sentences cited · 3.2s
These passages don't address that. None of the documents supplied concern a Cleveland Jewish Federation population study, and none report Cleveland-specific synagogue membership figures. The materials on synagogue membership here relate to Los Angeles [2][6][8][4], national and multi-community comparisons that include cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston but not Cleveland [1][3][7], and a bibliography of sources on Boston's Jewish community [5] — none of which describe a 1987 Cleveland study.
3 of 8 sources used · 50% of sentences cited · 3.2s
These passages contain nothing about a Cleveland Jewish Federation study or about Cleveland at all. The community-level synagogue membership figures here cover Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, and comparisons to national surveys [1][3][8], with no Cleveland data.
0 of 8 sources used · 0% of sentences cited · 14.8s
The passages provided do not mention the Cleveland Jewish Federation's 1987 population study or its findings about synagogue membership.
Out-of-scope probe
How did Los Angeles Jewish organizations respond to the 1918 influenza pandemic?
The right city, the wrong century. Every passage returned comes from the 2021 Brandeis study and concerns COVID-19 — the trap is whether a model blends them.
5 of 8 sources used · 33% of sentences cited · 2.9s
These passages don't address that. The corpus here consists entirely of excerpts from the 2021 Study of Jewish Los Angeles (Brandeis), which covers the COVID-19 pandemic era and its effects on program participation, well-being, and community engagement [1][2][4][6][7]. Nothing in these passages discusses the 1918 influenza pandemic or the response of Jewish organizations to it, and the pilot corpus as a whole is described as heavily weighted toward 1970 and later, so material from that earlier period would not be expected here in any case.
1 of 8 sources used · 33% of sentences cited · 3.1s
These passages don't address the 1918 influenza pandemic. Everything supplied here comes from the 2021 Study of Jewish Los Angeles, which concerns the COVID-19 pandemic that began in March 2020 [8]. The corpus provided contains no material on Los Angeles Jewish organizational life in the 1910s.
0 of 8 sources used · 0% of sentences cited · 11.9s
The passages provided do not address how Los Angeles Jewish organizations responded to the 1918 influenza pandemic.
What this does and doesn't establish
Five questions, one run each. The pass/fail properties — nothing invented, both probes refused — are solid. The percentages are not precise instruments: re-running the same questions moves them by several points, so small gaps between models should not be read as findings.
The collection is a pilot: roughly 180 documents matching “Los Angeles,” with 87% dated 1970 or later. Several answers below are shaped by that skew rather than by the archive as a whole.
The local model was run on an Apple M4 laptop with 16 GB of memory. It is the smallest model tested at 8 billion parameters, and a larger local model has not been tried.